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This paper contrasts the effects of tied and untied foreign aid programs on the welfare and macroeconomic 
performance of a small open economy. We show that the acceptance of tied aid inevitably obligates the 
recipient economy to undertake certain internal structural adjustments, and the flexibility it possesses to 
undertake these adjustments eventually determines the effectiveness of the aid program.  The economic 
consequences of tied and untied aid programs, their relative merits from a welfare standpoint, and the 
transitional dynamics depend crucially upon several characteristics of the recipient economy that 
summarize this flexibility.  These include: (i) the costs of installing public capital relative to private capital 
(intertemporal adjustment costs), (ii) the substitutability between factors of production (intratemporal 
adjustment costs), (iii) the flexibility of labor supply (work effort),  (iv) the recipient’s degree of access to 
the world financial markets (capital market imperfections), and (v) the recipient’s opportunities for co-
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  Official development assistance, in the form of foreign aid or unilateral capital transfers, 
represents an important channel through which wealth is transferred from rich, developed nations to 
poorer, underdeveloped economies.  Both the magnitude and the scope of these international 
transfers have increased significantly over the last four decades.  For example, total flows of official 
development assistance from members of the OECD and OPEC countries have increased from about 
$6 million in 1965 to over $59 million in 1999.  By that time these funds represented between 3-5 
percent of the Gross National Income of the recipient low and middle income countries, and 
financed between 10-20 percent of their gross capital formation.
1   
  One issue of concern for both donors and recipients is how foreign aid should be spent in an 
economy with scarce resources.  Guided either by self-interest, or to prevent the possibility of 
mismanagement of external funds, donor countries often impose restrictions on how such aid can be 
used by the recipient.  This has given rise to a long-standing debate, both in academic and policy 
circles, as to whether international transfers should be “tied” (“productive”) or “untied” (“pure”).  As 
Bhagwati (1967) points out, tied external assistance can take several forms.  It may be linked to a (i) 
specific investment project, (ii) specific commodity or service, or (iii) procurement in a specific 
country.  Recent studies by the World Bank, however, point out that over time, a larger proportion of 
foreign aid has become “untied” with respect to requirements for procuring goods and services from 
the donor country, but it has become more “tied” in the sense of being linked to investments in 
public infrastructure projects (telecommunications, energy, transport, water services, etc).  For 
example, between 1994 and 1999, the proportion of official development assistance that was 
“untied” in the sense of not being subject to restrictions by donors on procurement sources rose from 
66 percent to about 84 percent.  At the same time, between two-thirds and three-fourths of official 
development assistance was either fully or partially tied to public infrastructure projects (see 
footnote 1).  A recent example is the European Union’s assistance programs, both to its member 
nations as well as aspiring members.  These programs tied the flow of aid to the accumulation of 
                                                 
1 World Bank (1994, 2001). 
1 public capital, and were aimed at building up infrastructure in the recipient nation, thereby enabling 
it to attain a strong positive short-run growth differential relative to the EU average, achieve higher 
and sustainable living standards in alignment with EU standards, and ultimately gain accession to 
EU membership.
2   
  The move toward tying more aid to public investment has been dictated mainly by the 
growing infrastructure requirements of developing countries.  Most economists agree that investment 
in public infrastructure raises the productivity and efficiency of the private sector and, as a 
consequence, provides a crucial channel for economic growth, development, and higher living 
standards.
3  But financing the required investment in infrastructure has proven to be a challenging 
task for developing countries.  Most such countries have significantly restricted public sector 
borrowing after the debt-crisis of the early 1980s, while at the same time their infrastructure 
requirements have increased steadily.  A 1994 World Bank study has estimated these requirements 
to be $200 billion a year.  Facing binding fiscal constraints, governments in developing countries 
have turned to external financing, in the form of tied unilateral capital transfers, as a significant 
source of financing public investment.  This paper analyzes the consequences of such tied external 
assistance programs for the growth and macroeconomic performance of a developing economy. 
Is tied foreign aid always beneficial for the recipient economy?  To answer this question, one 
must acknowledge the fact that the acceptance of a tied transfer by the recipient inevitably obligates 
it to undertake some internal structural adjustments, and the flexibility it has to do this will 
determine the effectiveness (or otherwise) of the aid program.  Thus the consequences of tied versus 
untied aid on the growth path of the economy, and their relative merits from a welfare standpoint, 
depend crucially upon a number of key structural characteristics that summarize this flexibility.  
These characteristics include: (i) the costs associated with installing the publicly provided capital 
                                                 
2 Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal received unilateral capital transfers tied to public investment projects under the 
Structural Funds Program between 1989-1999.  A similar tied transfer program, called Agenda 2000, has been initiated 
for eleven aspiring member nations (Central Eastern European Countries), and is expected to continue until 2006. 
3 Theoretical and empirical interest in the impact of public capital on private capital accumulation and economic growth 
originated with the work of Arrow and Kurz (1970) and more recently with Aschauer (1989a, 1989b).  Most of this 
literature has focused on closed economies, using both the Ramsey model and the AK endogenous growth framework; 
see e.g. Futagami, Morita, and Shibata (1993), Baxter and King (1993), Fisher and Turnovsky (1998).  Turnovsky (1997) 
extends Futagami et. al. to a small open economy and introduces various forms of distortionary taxation, as well as the 
possibility of both external and internal debt financing.  Devarajan, Xie, and Zou (1998) address the issue of whether 
public capital should be provided through taxation or through granting subsidies to private providers. 
2 (intertemporal adjustment costs), (ii) the substitutability between public and private capital in 
production (intratemporal adjustment costs), (iii) the degree of access to the world financial market 
(financial adjustment costs), and (iv) the opportunities for co-financing infrastructure projects by 
domestic resources, like the domestic government or private sector.
4   
These issues have been analyzed in the context of an endogenous growth model by 
Chatterjee, Sakoulis, and Turnovsky (2003), and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2003).  But these papers 
share one crucial restriction, namely that labor supply in the recipient economy is fixed inelastically.  
This paper redresses this shortcoming by introducing endogenously supplied labor.  We show that 
since labor is also a (variable) factor of production like the two types of capital, the potential for 
substitution along the labor margin is also important in determining the dynamic effects of untied 
aid, and adds a further dimension to the debate on whether or not aid should be tied.  Just as the 
endogeneity of labor supply has proven to be crucial in determining the nature of the economy’s 
dynamic response to demand shocks in other contexts, introducing flexible labor supply is important 
in determining the dynamic response to an untied foreign aid shock, thus providing new insights into 
the contrasting responses to tied and untied foreign aid shocks.
5  
To capture the issues we wish to address, the model has a number of key characteristics.  
First, the production conditions are sufficiently flexible to accommodate both intratemporal and 
intertemporal factor substitution.  We specify the former by assuming that labor interacts with public 
capital to yield “labor efficiency units”, which then interact with private capital in accordance with a 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function.  Intertemporal substitution is captured 
by assuming that new investment in both types of capital involves convex installation costs.  Indeed, 
the impact of foreign aid on the evolution of the economy depends not only on the short-run degree 
of factor substitutability, but also on the relative costs of adjustment of the two types of capital. 
In the case of tied aid, the assistance is linked to the accumulation of public capital, and thus 
                                                 
4 It is entirely plausible that the large financial needs of developing countries for infrastructure investment will not be 
met by the flow of external assistance, and hence domestic co-financing assumes a lot of significance.  Recently, in a 
panel study of 56 developing countries and six four-year periods (1970-93), Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that foreign 
aid is most effective when combined with a good policy environment in the recipient economy.  Previously, Gang and 
Khan (1990) report that most bilateral aid for public investment in LDCs is tied, and is given on the condition that the 
recipient government devotes certain resources to the same project. 
5In the Ramsey model, for example, an increase in government consumption expenditure causes immediate crowding out 
of private consumption, when labor supply is fixed; otherwise it leads to transitional dynamics; see Turnovsky (2000). 
3 provides an important stimulus for private capital accumulation and growth.  We assume further that 
public investment in infrastructure is financed both by the domestic government as well as via the 
flow of international transfers, thereby incorporating the important element of domestic co-
financing, characteristic of the European Union’s and other bilateral aid programs that are tied to 
specific public investment projects.  In both cases, the transfers are assumed to be linked to the scale 
of the recipient economy and therefore are consistent with maintaining an equilibrium of sustained 
(endogenous) growth.  The model is sufficiently general to include the possibility of a third source of 
financing public infrastructure, namely the private sector of the economy.  By taxing private firms, 
and spending a fixed proportion of those taxes in financing new infrastructure, the government can 
ensure the private sector’s participation in building up the economy’s stock of infrastructure.
6 
We also assume that the small open economy faces restricted access to the world capital 
market in the form of an upward-sloping supply curve of debt, according to which the country’s cost 
of borrowing depends upon its debt position, relative to its capital stock, the latter serving as a 
measure of its debt-servicing capability.  This assumption is motivated by the large debt burdens of 
most developing countries, which give rise to the potential risk of default on international borrowing. 
Indeed, evidence suggesting that more indebted economies pay a premium on their loans from 
international capital markets to insure against default risk has been provided by Edwards (1984). 
Thus, the paper extends and contributes to the literature on foreign aid and macroeconomic 
performance in several important directions.  First, it analyzes the role of tied development 
assistance as a mode of financing public investment and its effect on the transitional adjustment path 
and its sensitivity to the structural conditions of a growing open economy.  Second, by relaxing the 
assumption of inelastic labor supply, it provides new insights into how the representative agents’ 
incentive to choose between work and leisure responds to tied and untied aid shocks, and how, in 
turn, that response impacts on the macroeconomic evolution of the economy, both in the short run as 
well as over time.  Third, since it is likely that external assistance and borrowing will not meet the 
total financial needs for public investment, domestic participation by both the government and the 
                                                 
6 The efficient use of infrastructure is a further important issue.  For example, Hulten (1996) shows that inefficient use of 
infrastructure accounts for more than 40 percent of the growth differential between high and low growth countries. 
4 private sector is also important.  This paper specifically characterizes the consequences of domestic 
co-financing of public investment and outlines the trade-offs faced by a recipient government when 
it responds to a flow of external assistance from abroad.  Finally, the question we address is also 
closely related to the “transfer problem”, one of the classic issues in international economics, dating 
back to Keynes (1929) and Ohlin (1929).  This early literature was concerned with “pure” transfers, 
which could be in the form of an unrestricted gift or as debt-relief.  By contrast, our analysis focuses 
on “productive” transfers, the use of which is tied to public investment.  The formulation we develop 
parameterizes the transfer so that we can conveniently identify the pure transfer and the productive 
transfer as polar cases.
7 
Given the complexity of the model, most of the analysis is conducted numerically.  The main 
results of our analysis are the following.  The effects of foreign aid depend critically on whether it is 
tied or untied.  Chatterjee et al. (2003) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2003) show that when labor 
supply is inelastic, even though a tied aid shock generates a dynamic adjustment, an untied aid shock 
has no dynamic consequences for the recipient economy, and leads only to instantaneous increases 
in consumption and welfare.  In contrast, we show that allowing the agent to adjust his work effort 
leads to fundamental differences in the economy’s response.  Under the assumption of flexible labor 
supply, both types of aid generate dynamic responses, albeit dramatically different in nature.  In the 
case of untied aid, they occur primarily through the labor-leisure choice and the effect this has on the 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and on the real wage rate.  For 
plausible parameters, the economy’s dynamic adjustment occurs rapidly with little effect on the 
stocks of capital.  However, although the economy’s current account and welfare improve in the 
long run, the reduced work effort and higher consumption leads to a decline in the equilibrium 
growth rate.  On the other hand, an aid program that is tied to investment in public capital generates 
a much more gradual dynamic adjustment, one that is exactly opposite in nature to that following an 
untied aid program.  There are significant trade-offs in welfare between the short run and the long 
run, as the agent increases his work effort and initially substitutes away from consumption toward 
                                                 
7Much of the discussion of the transfer problem (untied aid) focuses on the welfare effects, doing so in a static 
framework.  A recent paper by Djajic, Lahiri, and Raimondos-Møller (1999) analyzes the welfare effects of temporary 
untied foreign aid in a two country-two period model.  
5 investment.  The benefits of this substitution are realized only gradually over time, as the investment 
in public capital enhances productivity in the recipient economy and thereby increases consumption.  
The implied long-run changes in the relative capital stocks in the recipient economy are dramatic. 
The magnitude and the direction of the transitional dynamics and long-run effects depend 
crucially upon the elasticity of substitution between the two types of capital in the recipient 
economy.  Our analysis suggests that tied aid is more effective in terms of its impact on long-run 
growth and welfare for countries that have low substitutability between factors of production.  This 
finding has important policy implications, especially in light of recent empirical evidence suggesting 
that the elasticities of substitution for less developed or poor countries are significantly below unity.
8  
We find that the welfare gains from a particular type of aid program (tied or untied) are sensitive to 
the costs of installing public capital and capital market imperfections, even for small changes in the 
degree of substitutability between inputs.  Economies in which the elasticity of substitution between 
the two types of capital and the installation costs are relatively high are likely to find tied transfers to 
be welfare-deteriorating.  For such economies untied aid will be more appropriate. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 sets out the analytical 
structure and summarizes the macrodynamic equilibrium.  Section 3 conducts numerical simulations 
and considers their implications, while Section 4 performs substantial sensitivity analysis.  Section 5 
briefly addresses the issue of co-financing, while Section 6 concludes and provides some policy 
advice.  An Appendix provides the technical details underlying the derivation of the macrodynamic 
equilibrium. 
2.  The Analytical Framework 
  We begin by spelling out the building blocks of the model. 
2.1. Private  Sector 
We consider a small open economy populated by an infinitely-lived representative agent who 
produces and consumes a single traded commodity.  The agent has a unit of time, a fraction l of 
                                                 
8See Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000). 
6 which can be devoted to leisure, and the balance, 1 – l to labor supply.  Output, Y, of the commodity 
is produced using the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function 
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where K denotes the representative agent's stock of private capital, and KG denotes the stock of 
public capital.  The latter provides an externality, interacting with the agent’s labor supply to yield 
labor measured in efficiency units, (1− l)KG.  The quantity  1( 1 ) s ρ ≡ +  measures the intratemporal 
elasticity of substitution between private capital and “efficiency units of labor” in production.  The 
production function has constant returns to scale in both the private factors of production, K and (1-
l), and the accumulating factors,  , enabling it to support an equilibrium of ongoing growth 
with both private factors being paid their respective marginal physical products. 
, G KK
  The agent consumes this good at the rate C, yielding utility over an infinite horizon 
represented by the isoelastic utility function:
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where θ  represents the relative importance of leisure in utility.  The agent also accumulates physical 
capital, with expenditure on a given change in the capital stock, I, involving adjustment (installation) 
costs specified by the quadratic (convex) function 
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This equation is an application of the familiar cost of adjustment framework, where we assume that 
the adjustment costs are proportional to the rate of investment per unit of installed capital (rather 
than its level).  The linear homogeneity of this function is necessary for a steady-state equilibrium 
having ongoing growth to be sustained. The net rate of capital accumulation is thus  
             ( 1 d )   K I K K δ − = 
 
9 The exponent γ  is related to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution e, by  1( 1 ) e γ = − , with γ = 0 being equivalent 
to a logarithmic utility function. 
7 where δK denotes the rate of depreciation of private capital. 
Agents may borrow internationally on a world capital market.  The key factor we wish to 
take into account is that the creditworthiness of the economy influences its cost of borrowing from 
abroad.  Essentially, we assume that world capital markets assess an economy's ability to service 
debt costs and the associated default risk, the key indicator of which is the country's debt-capital 
(equity) ratio.  As a result, the interest rate countries are charged on world capital markets increases 
with this ratio.  This leads to the upward sloping supply schedule for debt, expressed by assuming 
that the borrowing rate,  ( K N r ) , charged on (national) foreign debt, N, relative to the stock of 
private capital, K, is of the form: 
    () ( ) 0 >     ;
* ω ω ′ + = K N r K N r       ( 1 e )  
where  r
* is the exogenously given world interest rate, and  ( ) K N ω  is the country-specific 
borrowing premium that increases with the nation's debt-capital ratio.  The homogeneity of the 
relationship is required to sustain a balanced growth equilibrium.
10  
The agent’s decision problem is to choose consumption, labor supply, and the rates of capital 
and debt accumulation, to maximize intertemporal utility (1b) subject to the flow budget constraint 
                             () ( ) ,( 1 ) NCr N K N I K YT τ =+ + Ψ −− +                             (2) 
where N is the stock of debt held by the private sector, τ is the income tax rate, and T  denotes lump-
sum taxes.
11  It is important to emphasize that in performing his optimization, the representative 
agent takes the borrowing rate, r(.) as given.  This is because the interest rate facing the debtor 
                                                 
10A rigorous derivation of (1e) presumes the existence of risk.  Since we do not wish to model a full stochastic economy, 
we should view (1e) as representing a convenient reduced form, one supported by empirical evidence; see e.g. Edwards 
(1984) who finds a significant positive relationship between the spread over LIBOR (e.g. r
*) and the debt-GNP ratio.  
Aizenman and Turnovsky (2002) provide a formal justification for the relationship (1e) in a world in which lenders are 
subject to default risk.  Various formulations of reduced form relationships such as (1e) can be found in the literature.  
The original formulation by Bardhan (1967) expressed the borrowing premium in terms of the absolute stock of debt; see 
also Obstfeld (1982), Bhandari, Haque, and Turnovsky (1990).  
 Other authors such as Sachs (1984) also argue for a 
homogeneous function such as (1e).  We have also adopted different specifications, including the Edwards (1984) 
formulation,  ( rr N Y = ) , and  ( ( G K K =+ ) ) rN , so that both private and public capital serve as collateral.  In both 
cases similar results to those reported are obtained.   
11 It is natural for us to assume N > 0, so that the country is a debtor nation.  However, it is possible for N < 0 in which 
case the agent accumulates credit by lending abroad.  For simplicity, interest income is assumed to be untaxed. 
8 nation, as reflected in its upward sloping supply curve of debt, is a function of the economy's 
aggregate debt-capital ratio, which the individual agent assumes he is unable to influence.   
The optimality conditions with respect to the individual’s choices of C, l, and I are  
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     () 1 hI K q + 1        ( 3 c )   =
where λ  is the shadow value of wealth in the form of internationally traded bonds, q’ is the shadow 
value of the agent’s private capital stock, and q = q’/ν is defined as the market price of private 
capital in terms of the (unitary) price of foreign bonds.  Equation (3a) equates the marginal utility of 
consumption to the shadow value of wealth, while (3b) equates the marginal utility of leisure to the 
shadow value of after-tax income foregone, where  ( ) 1 Yl ∂ ∂−  () () { }
1 () ( 11G Yl l K
ρρ ηα
+ ≡− −  
is the marginal product of labor and equals the equilibrium wage rate. It is well known that as θ  
increases, the equilibrium elasticity of labor supply declines.  The third equation equates the 
marginal cost of an additional unit of investment, inclusive of the marginal installation cost,  1 K hI  
to the market value of capital.  Equation (3c) may be immediately solved to yield the following 
expression for the growth rate of private capital 
)
ρ
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  Applying the standard optimality conditions with respect to N and K leads to the usual 
arbitrage relationships, equating the rates of return on consumption and investment in private capital 
to the costs of borrowing from abroad 
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9 Finally, in order to ensure that the agent’s intertemporal budget constraint is met, the following 






→∞ =  lim
t→∞ ′  q Ke
−βt = 0.                                               (4c) 
2.2  Public Capital, Foreign Aid, and National Debt 
The resources for the accumulation of public capital come from two sources: domestically 
financed government expenditure on public capital, G , and a program of capital transfers or foreign 
aid, TR, from the rest of the world.  We therefore postulate  
GG T R φ ≡+      01 φ ≤ ≤    (5) 
where φ  represents the degree to which the transfers from abroad are tied to investment in the stock 
of public infrastructure.  The case φ = 1 implies that transfers are completely tied to investment in 
public capital, representing a “productive” transfer.  In the other polar case, φ = 0, transfers are 
completely unrestricted and hence represent a “pure” transfer, of the Keynes-Ohlin type.   
We assume that the gross accumulation of public capital, G, is also subject to convex costs of 
adjustment, similar to that of private capital
12 
( )( ) ( ) 2 (, ) 1 2 GG GK G h GK Γ= + .   
In addition, the public capital stock depreciates at the rate,  G δ , so that its net rate of accumulation is 
                               .                                                         (6)  GG KG K δ =− 
G
                                                
To sustain an equilibrium of on-going growth, both domestic government expenditure on 
 
12Note that there are different ways of specifying how aid is tied.  The specification (5) does so by relating it to the 
accumulation of new public capital.  An alternative formulation is to tie the aid to total investment costs, inclusive of 
installation costs, replacing (5) by  (, ) (, ) GG GK GK T R φ Ω− Ω= .  The difference between these two specifications is 
minor and is as follows.  Equation (5) implies that to the extent that the transfer is tied in this way (0 ) φ > , a larger 
transfer increases installation costs that must be financed by some other domestic source, leading to the crowding out of 
private consumption, and thus reducing the benefits from the foreign transfer.  According to the alternative specification, 
higher installation costs imply that more of the transfer is committed to installing the capital, leaving less available for 
the accumulation of new capital.  These two specifications thus imply analogous tradeoffs between the rate of 
accumulation of new public capital and its associated installation costs, and thus have similar implications.  Since there is 
no compelling evidence favoring one formulation over the other, we adopt (5), which turns out to be marginally simpler. 
10 infrastructure (G ) and the flow of aid from abroad must be tied to the scale of the economy 
    , and  ,  0 1 ,  0,  0 1 Y T R Y g g σσ == < < > < + Gg   σ <
Substituting into (5) and then into (6), we can rewrite the latter in the following form 
           () GG Kg YK σφ δ =+ − 
G ;                      (6’) 
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.                                              (6) 
The government sets its tax and expenditure parameters to continuously maintain a balanced budget: 
(, ) G YT RT G K τ ++ = Γ                                             (7) 
The national budget constraint, (the current account) is obtained by combining (7) and (2), 
() ( ) ( ) ,, G Nr N K NC I K G K YT R =+ + Ψ + Γ −  − .     (8) 
Equation (8) states that the economy accumulates debt to finance its total expenditures on public 
capital, private capital, consumption, and interest payments net of output produced and transfers 
received.  It is immediately apparent that higher consumption or investment raises the rate at which 
the economy accumulates debt.  The direct effect of a larger unit transfer on the growth rate of debt 
is given by  () 2 (1 ) G hK G φ φ −+ .  An interesting observation is that the more transfers are tied to 
public investment (the higher φ), the lower the decrease in the growth rate of debt. When transfers 
are completely tied to investment in infrastructure, i.e., φ =1, debt increases due to higher installation 
costs.  However, the indirect effects induced by the change will still need to be taken into account. 
 2.3.  Macroeconomic Equilibrium 
  The steady-state equilibrium of the economy has the characteristic that all real aggregate 
quantities grow at the same constant rate, and that the labor allocation, l, and the relative price of 
capital, q, are constant.  We show in the Appendix how the equilibrium dynamics of the system can 
11 be conveniently expressed in terms of the following stationary variables, z≡ KG K,  n ≡ N K , both 
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and the growth rates of the two types of capital are  
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Equations (9a) – (9d) provide an autonomous set of dynamic equations in   of which, 
two   are state variables, while the remaining two   are “jump” variables, free to respond 
instantaneously to new information as it becomes available.  Once z and l are known, the output-
capital ratio and the consumption-output ratio are determined in accordance with (10b) and (10c).   
, ,  , and  zn l q
( , ) kn ( , ) ql
12 The economy reaches steady state when  0 znlq = ===    .  Applying these conditions in (9a) 
- (9d) we can determine  , along with the steady-state interest rate   and the long-
run growth rate 
,  ,  , and  zqn l    () rn 
ψ  .  Given  , (10c) yields c.  The explicit solution for the steady-state 
equilibrium is set out in the Appendix.  Because this system is highly non-linear, it need not be 
consistent with a well-defined steady-state equilibrium with  .  Our numerical simulations, 
however, yield well-defined steady-state values for all plausible specifications of all the structural 
and policy parameters of the model. 
 and  zl   
0 z >  , 0 c > 
Linearizing (9a) – (9d) around the steady-state yields the local dynamic system 
                           ( )  X X Χ=        ( 1 2 )   Λ −  
where  () ,, , znlq ′ Χ= ,  () ,,, X znlq ′ =     , and Λ represents the coefficient matrix of the linearized 
system, defined explicitly in the Appendix.  The determinant of the coefficient matrix of (12) can be 
shown to be positive under the condition that  ( ) rn ψ >    i.e., the steady-state interest rate facing the 
small open economy must be greater than the steady-state growth rate of the economy.  Imposing the 
transversality condition (4c), we see that this condition is indeed satisfied.  Since (12) is a fourth-
order system, a positive determinant implies that there could be 2 or 4 positive (unstable) roots.  In 
order to yield a saddlepoint-stable solution, we require that there be two unstable roots, to match the 
two jump variables.  Our numerical simulations yield saddle-point stable behavior for all plausible 
ranges of parameters, with two positive (unstable) and two negative (stable) roots, the latter being 
denoted by µ1 and µ2, withµ2 < µ1 < 0. 
  Equations (9) and (10) represent “core” dynamic equations from which other key variables, 
including the various growth rates, may be derived.  We have already noted how the growth rates of 
the two capital goods can be immediately inferred from (11a) and (11b).  In addition, the growth 
rates of consumption and output are given by  
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13 where   are defined in the Appendix.  Although the growth rates diverge during the 
transition, they ultimately converge to the common equilibrium rate 
(.), (.) FG
K G ψ ψ =  CY ψ ψψ ===  . 
3.  The Dynamic Effects of Foreign Aid: A Numerical Analysis 
  Due to the complexity of the model, we will employ numerical methods to examine the 
dynamic effects of a foreign aid or a transfer shock.  We begin by calibrating a benchmark economy, 
using the following parameters representative of a small open economy, which starts out from an 
equilibrium with zero transfers/aid. 
The Benchmark Economy 
 
Preference parameters:        γ = -1.5, β = 0.04,  1 θ =  
Production parameters:       α = 0.6, η = 0.2, h1 =15, h2  = 15 
Elasticity of substitution 
in production:                      1 s =  
Depreciation rates:             δK = 0.05, δG = 0.05 
World interest rate:             = 0.06,  
* r
Premium on borrowing:     a = 0.15
13 
Policy parameters:             τ = 0.15, g = 0.05 
Transfers:                             σ  = 0, φ = 0 
Our choices of preference parameters β,γ , and depreciation rates, δK,δG, the world interest 
rate,   are standard, while 
* r α is a scale variable.  The productive elasticity of public capital η = 0.2
(1 ) l
 
is consistent with the empirical evidence (see Gramlich, 1994).  But given the introduction of labor 
in efficiency units, this implies the productive elasticity of labor is also 0.2, while that of private 
capital is 0.8.  An inevitable feature of calibrating a Romer (1986) - type AK model is that keeping 
the size of the externality plausible, while maintaining the assumption of constant returns to scale in 
the private factors, imposes constraints on the elasticities on labor and private capital.  In order to 
reconcile these elasticities with the empirical evidence on the income shares of labor and private 
capital, it is necessary to interpret K as an amalgam of physical and human capital, with  −  
describing “raw” unskilled labor; see Rebelo (1991).  The borrowing premium   is chosen to  0.15 = a
                                                 
13 The functional specification of the upward sloping supply curve that we use is: ( )
* 1
an r e rn= +− .  Thus, in the case of 
a perfect world capital market, when a = 0, 
* rr = , the world interest rate. 
14 ensure a plausible equilibrium national debt to output ratio.  The elasticity on leisure, θ , is the 
crucial determinant of the equilibrium labor-leisure allocation and has too been set to ensure that this 
is empirically plausible.  The tax rate is set at τ = 0.15, while the rate of government expenditure on 
public investment is assumed to be  0.05 g = .  The choice of adjustment costs is less obvious and our 
choice h1 = 15 lies in the consensus range of 10 to 16.
14  We have also assumed smaller values ofh , 
with little change in results.  Note also that the equality of adjustment costs between the two types of 
capital serves as a plausible benchmark. 
i
Setting  , the benchmark technology is thus Cobb-Douglas, and the equilibrium derived 
from the above parameter specification is reported in Table 1, Row 1.
1 s =
15  It implies a steady-state 
ratio of public to private capital of 0.25; the consumption-output ratio is 0.60, the debt to GDP ratio 
of 0.42, leading to an equilibrium borrowing premium of 2.13% over the world rate of 6%.  The 
capital-output ratio is around 2.5, while 78% of the agent’s time is allocated to leisure, consistent 
with empirical evidence, yielding a long-run growth rate of around 1.65%.  This equilibrium is a 
reasonable characterization of a small-medium indebted economy, experiencing a modest steady rate 
of growth and having a relatively small stock of public capital.  The critical parameters upon which 
we focus are (i) the elasticity of substitution in production, s, and (ii) the elasticity of leisure in 
utility, θ.  In Table 2, we allow these to vary between s= 0.8−1.6, θ = 0.5− 5
2
, for both tied and 
untied transfers, respectively.
16 We also consider changes in h  and a.   
                                                 
14For example, Origueira and Santos (1997) choose h1 = 16 on the grounds that it generates a plausible speed of 
convergence leads to Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) assume h1 = 10, recognizing that this is at the low values of 
estimates, while Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) propose a value above 10.  Values of  in this range yield equilibrium 
values of the “Tobin q” in the empirically plausible range of 1.3 - 1.4. 
i h
15 The original specification of the CES production function was in terms of capital and raw labor.  Extensive empirical 
evidence on the elasticity of substitution between these two inputs was produced during the 1960’s and 1970’s.  Berndt 
(1976) provides a reconciliation between alternative estimates for the aggregate production function, concluding that 
they generally range between around 0.8 and 1.2, thus suggesting that the Cobb-Douglas serves as a reasonable 
benchmark.  In a recent panel study of 82 countries over a 28-year period, Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) find that they 
can reject the Cobb-Douglas specification for the entire sample in favor of the CES function.  They also report that the 
degree of substitution between inputs (in their case human and physical capital) may vary with the stages of 
development.  Empirical evidence on the substituability between public and private capital is sparse.  Lynde and 
Richmond (1993) introduce public and private capital into a more general translog production function for U.K. 
manufacturing and find that the Cobb-Douglas specification is rejected. 
16Because the derivation of the CES production function involves two arbitrary constants of integration, there are many 
different specifications of the CES function, which differ by how these constants are determined; see Klump and Preisler 
(2000).  In our specification, we assume that these constants are set so that  , αη remain constant, independent of the 
elasticity of substitution.  But it is also possible for these parameters to depend upon s, in which case as s is changed, 
these parameters would change correspondingly.  
15 3.1.  A Permanent Increase in the Flow of  Foreign Aid: Long Run Effects   
We now consider the introduction of a permanent foreign aid flow to the above benchmark 
Cobb-Douglas economy.  Specifically, the foreign aid is tied to the scale of the recipient economy, 
and increases from 0% of GDP in the initial steady-state to 5% of GDP in the new steady-state (an 
increase in σ  from 0 to 0.05).  However, this aid may be tied to new investment in public capital (φ 
= 1), representing the case of a “productive” transfer, or it may be untied (φ = 0), representing the 
case of a “pure” transfer from abroad.  The long-run and short-run responses of key variables in the 
recipient economy are reported in Rows 2 and 3 in Tables 1a and 1b.  In addition, the final columns 
in the tables summarize the effects on long-run welfare, [ ] W ∆ , and short-run welfare, [ (0)] W ∆ , 
both measured by the optimized utility of the representative agent where C and l are evaluated along 
the equilibrium path.  These welfare changes are measures of equivalent variation, calculated as the 
percentage change in the initial stock of capital necessary to maintain the level of welfare unchanged 
following the particular shock.  The differences between the two types of transfer are dramatic. 
We first consider the long-run effects of an increase in foreign aid (Table1a) and then discuss 
the short-run transitional dynamics generated by this shock (Table 1b and Figure 1).   
3.1.1      Tied Aid 
  The long run impact of a tied capital transfer is reported in Row 2 of Table 1a.  Since the aid 
is tied directly to investment in public capital, in the new steady state the ratio of public to private 
capital increases dramatically from 0.25 to 0.54, as a consequence of the investment boom in 
infrastructure.  The increase in the stock of public capital increases the marginal productivity of 
private capital and labor, thereby leading to a positive, though lesser, accumulation of private capital 
and increasing employment time from 0.220 to 0.232.  Although the transfer stimulates consumption 
through the wealth effect, (like the pure transfer) the higher long-run productive capacity has a 
greater effect on output, leading to a decline in the long-run consumption-output ratio from 0.60 to 
0.563.  The higher productivity raises the long-run growth rate to 2.31%, while long-run welfare 
improves by 7.96%, as indicated in the last column of Row 2.  The increased accumulation of both 
16 private and public capital lead to a higher demand for external borrowing as a means of financing 
new investment in private capital and the installation costs of public capital.  This results in an 
increase in the steady state debt-output ratio from 0.42 to 0.62, raising the borrowing premium to 
nearly 3.8%.  However, this higher debt relative to output is sustainable since it is caused by higher 
investment demand rather than by higher consumption demand.  The long run increase in the 
economy’s productive capacity (as measured by the higher stocks of public and private capital, and 
output) ensures that the higher debt is sustainable.
17   
3.1.2      Untied Aid 
A permanent pure transfer shock, i.e., an aid flow not tied to any investment activity, has 
precisely the opposite qualitative effects.  With the exception of the effects on consumption and 
leisure, the changes are much smaller in magnitude.  Being untied, the transfer is devoted to debt 
reduction, which allows an increase in consumption, with the debt to income ratio declining to 0.396 
and the consumption-output ratio rising to around 0.65.  The increase in consumption raises the 
marginal utility of leisure, increasing the fraction of time devoted to leisure from around 0.78 to 
0.793.  With the aid being untied, there is no incentive to invest and the ratio of public to private 
capital remains virtually unchanged.  With the shift toward more consumption and leisure, 
productivity of both types of capital decline and the equilibrium growth rate is marginally reduced 
from 1.65% to 1.60%, leading to an overall increase in welfare of around 7.71%, marginally less 
than for the tied transfer.   
3.2      Transitional Dynamics 
3.2.1 Tied  Aid 
The transitional adjustment paths following the increase in tied aid are illustrated in Figure 1 
for the benchmark economy.  Fig. 1.1 illustrates the stable adjustment-locus in z-n space, indicating 
how z and n both generally increase together during the transition.  
                                                 
17 This view has also been expressed by Roubini and Wachtel (1998). 
17 The immediate effect of the tied transfer is to raise the growth of public capital, to above 8% 
on impact, thereby raising the productivity of both private capital and labor.  Given the cost of 
borrowing, the higher return to capital causes an instantaneous upward jump in the shadow price of 
private capital, q, from its initial benchmark level of 2 to 2.04, thereby inducing a corresponding 
increase in private investment.  At the same time, the higher productivity of labor induces an 
immediate, but slight, decline in leisure from 0.780 to 0.777.  While the upward jump in q reduces 
the rate of return on private capital, the increase in labor raises the return.  On balance, the former 
slightly dominates and immediately after its initial increase, q begins to drop slightly to around 2.03, 
after the first five periods.  Leisure drops steadily toward its new equilibrium level of 0.768, so that 
after a few periods its positive productivity effect dominates, and q begins to rise monotonically 
toward its new equilibrium level of 2.10; see Figs. 1.2 and 1.3.   
The introduction of the tied transfer leads to an initial short-run decline in the consumption-
output ratio [Fig. 1.4].  This is because the short-run substitution from leisure to labor both increases 
output and reduces the marginal utility of consumption.  Thereafter, as the larger capital stocks are 
reflected in more output, the consumption-output ratio continues to decline monotonically toward its 
new long-run equilibrium value; leisure and the consumption-output ratio move together.  The 
contrasting time paths of the four growth rates,  , , , and  K GY C ψ ψψ ψ during the transition toward 
their common long-run growth rate, of 2.31% is strikingly illustrated in Fig. 1.6.  With public capital 
being directly stimulated by the transfer, its growth rate jumps initially to over 8.3% before 
gradually declining.  By contrast, private capital increases only very gradually from 1.95% to 2.31% 
during the transition, as the accumulation of public capital enhances its productivity.  The growth 
rate of output is a weighted average of the growth rates of the two capital stocks (plus the temporary 
growth of labor, which is small) and thus it immediately increases sharply to 3.5% with the transfer.  
On the other hand, the only influence on the initial growth rate of consumption is the (small) effect 
that operates through the labor supply and the labor-leisure choice, raising its growth rate from 
1.65% to 1.87%.  Thereafter it responds only gradually, in response to the accumulation of assets in 
the economy.  It always lies below the growth rate of output, so that C  is falling, as noted in Fig. 
1.4.  However, the level of consumption is still growing, albeit at a modest rate. 
Y
18 The final aspect of the dynamics concerns the debt-output ratio.  Starting at 0.416, the short-
run increase in output leads to a very slight initial decline in the debt-output ratio, after which it 
increases monotonically through time.  This is because the accumulation of public capital raises the 
average productivity of private capital, while the accumulation of both types of capital raises the 
need to borrow from abroad.  However, the higher debt, being backed by a higher productive 
capacity through the tied transfer is sustainable. 
3.2.2      Untied Aid 
  The transitional dynamics following an untied transfer are illustrated in Figure 2 and three 
points should be made at the outset.  First, the existence of the transitional dynamics depends 
crucially upon the endogeneity of labor supply.  If labor supply is inelastic, then an untied transfer 
has no dynamic effects and the economy moves instantaneously to its new steady-state; see 
Chatterjee et al. (2003).  Second, the dynamics are in sharp contrast to those of the tied transfer, 
being more or less a reversal.  This reflects the fact, noted in Table 2 that the long-run responses of 
the economy are generally in the opposite direction.  Third, the dynamics are generally much more 
rapid than in response to a tied transfer.  Thus, for example, labor supply and the consumption-
output ratio almost complete their entire adjustment on impact. 
  Fig. 2.1 illustrates the transitional adjustment paths for the two state variables, debt/private 
capital and public capital/private capital.  We see that on receipt of the transfer, these move in 
opposite directions, implying that on impact the debt-capital ratio begins to decline, while the public-
private capital ratio begins to increase.  Indeed, the untied transfer is initially applied primarily to 
debt reduction, which allows an immediate substantial increase in consumption, increasing the 
marginal utility of leisure, and thus inducing an immediate sharp reduction in labor supply.   
The main impact of an untied transfer is on consumption, leisure, and debt reduction, as 
illustrated in Figs. 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5.  Its initial impact is to raise the marginal utility of leisure causing 
a reduction in labor supply, and hence in the productivity of private capital, public capital, and in q.  
The receipt of the untied transfer has a slightly less adverse short-run effect on the growth rate of 
public capital, reducing it to 1.57%, slightly above that of private capital, 1.55%.  As z increases, the 
19 productivity of public capital declines relative to private capital, causing their relative growth rates 
to reverse.  After four periods the growth rate of private capital exceeds that of public capital and z 
begins to decline with n.  The decline in q is partially reversed during the subsequent transition as 
the relative stock of public to private capital declines.   
Although, the overall intertemporal welfare gains for the two types of transfers are 
comparable (7.96% vs. 7.71%), this contrast in the dynamics leads to a sharp contrast in the time-
profile that the benefits yield.  In the case of the tied transfer, the initial commitment toward public 
investment involves consumption losses and less leisure, leading to a short-run welfare loss of 
around 1.53%.  Over time, as the fruits of the investment are borne, and the economy becomes more 
productive, consumption increases rapidly.  Welfare increases rapidly over time, with subsequent 
gains offsetting the initial losses, resulting in an overall intertemporal welfare increase of nearly 8%.  
The response to an untied transfer is a much more uniform increase in consumption and leisure, 
resulting in an almost constant improvement in welfare, though of a slightly smaller magnitude. 
4. Sensitivity  Analysis 
  The contrast between the tied and untied transfers is striking.  It is therefore important to 
determine how sensitive this is to the chosen parameter values for the benchmark economy.  This is 
investigated in the results summarized in Tables 2 – 4, where the sensitivity in the following 
dimensions is considered: 
(i)  elasticity of substitution in production (s); 
(ii)  flexibility of labor supply (θ ); 
(iii)  cost of installing public capital, relative to that of private capital ( );  2 h
(iv)  cost of borrowing from international capital markets (a). 
4.1  Elasticity of substitution in production (s) versus flexibility in labor supply () θ  
Table 2 presents a grid summarizing the changes in key variables in response to equal 
amounts of tied aid and untied aid, respectively, as the elasticity of substitution in production, s, 
varies between 0.8 and 1.6, while θ  runs between 0.5 and 5.  One interesting feature is that the 
20 effects of the tied transfer on the growth rate and welfare, in particular, are highly sensitive to 
relatively minor deviations from the benchmark value of  1 s =  (Cobb-Douglas).  Thus, for example, 
if a researcher estimates   with a standard error of 0.1 – a tight estimate - and if  1 s = 1 θ = , then, with 
95% probability the implied increase of 0.66 percentage points on the growth rate could be as high 
as 0.98 or as low as 0.45.  It is important to stress that a sustained difference in the growth rate of 
nearly half a percentage point accumulates to a substantial difference in economic performance.  
This can be seen from the spread on the implied welfare gain of 7.97%, which is even larger, ranging 
between 21.1% or as low as 0.53%. 
θ
s
Looking though the two panels of Table 2, the following observations can be made. 
(i)   The tendency for tied and untied transfers to have opposite long-run effects is robust 
to variations in s and θ . 
(ii)   Tied transfers have substantially greater long-run effects on variables involving asset 
accumulation, than do untied transfers.  The effects on consumption and leisure are comparable in 
magnitude (though opposite in direction). 
(iii) Increasing  s reduces the positive effect of a tied transfer on the growth rate, while 
reducing the negative effect on the consumption-output and capital-output ratios.  It decreases the 
adverse effect of an untied transfer on the growth rate, while reducing the positive effect on the 
consumption-output and capital-output ratios.  
(iv)   Increasing   reduces the positive effect of a tied transfer on the growth rate, and 
reduces the adverse effect on the consumption-output and capital-output ratios.  It increases the 
adverse effect of an untied transfer on the growth rate, while reducing the positive effect on the 
consumption-output and capital-output ratios. 
(v)  Both the short-run and the intertemporal welfare gains of an untied transfer are 
relatively insensitive to both   and θ .  For plausible ranges of the parameters a 5% untied transfer 
leads to a uniform welfare gain of about 7-8%, measured as an equivalent variation in initial capital. 
21 (vi)  In contrast, both the short-run and long-run welfare gains from a tied transfer are 
highly sensitive to both parameters, particularly for low elasticities of substitution.  Long-run 
welfare gains decline with s and increase with θ  for low elasticities of substitution.  For high 
elasticities of substitution, the tied transfer yields both short-run and long-run losses, the former 
being relatively independent of θ , and the latter increasing with θ .   
  Results (v) and (vi) are two key findings, and the intuition underlying them is as follows.  A 
pure transfer has little effect on the stocks of public or private capital; virtually  all that happens is 
that consumption increases, raising the C  ratio.  The higher elasticity of substitution raises the 
level of output attainable from given stocks of capital, thereby raising consumption and welfare 
approximately uniformly.  If the transfer is tied, the transfer increases the rate of investment in 
public capital.  With a low elasticity of substitution this requires an approximately corresponding 
increase in private capital, leading to a large increase in output, consumption, and benefits.  As the 
elasticity of substitution increases, the higher public capital is associated with a larger decline of 
private capital, so that the increase in output, consumption, and welfare declines.  This is 
exacerbated by the fact that for a high elasticity of substitution, the tied transfer generates a large 
increase in the real wage and its growth rate, leading to substantial substitution toward labor 
(welfare-reducing). 
Y
One of the most interesting results in Table 2 is the contrast in the response of leisure for 
 from those obtained for higher values of s, in the case of the tied transfer.  As noted 
previously, for the Cobb-Douglas production function, by increasing the productivity of labor, a tied 
transfer will tend to encourage more labor and cause a shift away from leisure, an effect that is 
exacerbated as the elasticity of substitution increases.  For low  , this effect is reversed, and the 
intuition can be seen most clearly by focusing on the polar case of the fixed coefficient production 
function,  .  In this case, private capital, K, and labor in efficiency units, (
0.8 s =
s
0 s = 1 ) g lK − , need to 
change proportionately.  Since a tied transfer leads to an increase in the relative stock,  g zKK ≡ , 
this must be accompanied by a decrease in labor supply (i.e. an increase in leisure) in order for 
 to remain constant and for production to remain efficient.  As s increases through low values 
this effect continues, although it declines in size as the production function becomes more flexible.  
(1 ) lz −
22 Moreover, since   leads to a short-run increase in leisure, it is actually associated with small 
short-run welfare gains, rather than losses, as before.  These compound to large gains over time as 
the investment comes to fruition.` 
0.8 s =
The above results suggest that insofar as its effect on long run growth and welfare is 
concerned, a tied aid program is more effective in countries with a low elasticity of substitution in 
production.  This observation complements the recent findings of Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) 
that less developed or poor countries have elasticities of substitution that are significantly below 
unity and developed or richer countries have elasticities that are significantly above unity.  In such a 
scenario, our analysis shows that a tied aid program may be more effective for poor countries than 
for their richer counterparts. 
4.2. Transitional  Dynamics 
We have recomputed the transitional paths allowing for variations in θ  and in s.  Changing 
θ  has little effect on the qualitative nature of the transitional paths, just as it does on the steady state.  
The more interesting changes result from increasing the elasticity of substitution and are illustrated 
in Figs. 3 and 4.   
Fig. 3 compares the transitional time paths for leisure and the consumption-output ratio, 
following a tied transfer, for the three values  0.5,1,1.6 s = .  As already observed, for the benchmark 
economy, l and CY move together.  For a low elasticity of substitution ( ), leisure generally 
increases, for reasons discussed in Section 4.1.  The initial increase in leisure increases the marginal 
utility of consumption, so that 
0.5 s =
C  initially increases, after which it declines steadily.  This implies 
that l and 
Y
C  move in opposite directions throughout the transition.  For a high elasticity of 
substitution,  l initially declines and continues to decline during the transition, just as in the 
benchmark case.  But in this case, the initial decline in l is sufficiently sharp to cause a sharp decline 
in initial consumption, C .  The 
Y
(0) CY ratio overshoots its long-run response, and thus rises during 
the transition, implying again that l and CY move in opposite directions throughout the transition.   
Fig. 4 illustrates the sensitivity of the dynamic adjustments of the basic state variables, z and 
n, to an increase in s.  Panel I illustrates the case of tied transfers.  As the elasticity of substitution 
23 increases, the curvature of the adjustment path increases.  The higher the degree of substitution 
between the two types of capital, the more the transfer increases the initial growth rate of public 
capital relative to that of private capital.
18   At the same time, the rate of debt accumulation 
increases, raising borrowing costs.  Over time, as the growth rate of public capital declines and that 
of private capital increases, foreign borrowing and borrowing costs fall.  For a very high elasticity of 
substitution, we get very rapidly increasing debt and borrowing costs during the early phases of the 
transition.  However, over time, these inhibit borrowing and debt eventually declines.  In the limiting 
case where the two types of capital are perfect substitutes, n ultimately returns to its initial level. 
Panel II illustrates the case of untied transfers.  The main point to observe is that the initial 
period of an increasing public-private capital ratio, which prevails only briefly for the benchmark 
case, is much more prolonged for a low elasticity of substitution, while for a high elasticity of 
substitution z declines uniformly along with n. 
4.3  Welfare Sensitivity to Investment Costs and Capital Market Imperfections  
  Tables 3 and 4 conduct further sensitivity analysis.  Specifically, they compare the welfare 
gains from tied and untied aid programs, focusing on the tradeoffs between (i) the cost of installing 
public capital (h ),relative to that of private capital, and (ii) the cost of borrowing from international 
capital markets (a).  Table 3 examines the sensitivity of this tradeoff to the elasticity of substitution, 
while Table 4 relates it to the elasticity of labor supply. 
2
  Specifically, Table 3 addresses the following question:  For a given cost of installing public 
capital, what are the respective gains from a tied and an untied aid program when (i) the cost of 
borrowing increases (measured by an increase in a across a row), and (ii) the elasticity of 
substitution increases (measured by an increase in s down a column).  Thus, a = 0.05 implies a low 
cost of borrowing from international capital markets, and a = 1 implies that the agent has virtually 
no access to international capital markets.  The range of s we consider is from 0.8 to 1.2  We 
consider three values for investment costs for public capital, with h2 = 1, 10, and 20 signifying low, 
medium, and high costs of installing public capital.  For example, in Table 3A, when h2 = 1, a = 
                                                 
18 Care must be exercised in comparing the slopes of the nz − loci in Figs. 1.1 – 2.1, as the units vary. 
24 0.05, and s = 0.8, the welfare gain from an untied transfer is 6.39%, while from a tied transfer it is 
36.38%. The following observations can be drawn from Tables 3 and 4. 
  (i)     The previous findings that an increase in the elasticity of substitution: (i) always 
increases the welfare gains resulting from a pure transfer, and (ii) reduces the welfare gains resulting 
from a tied transfer, hold for all a and  .  The fact that the latter may lead to a welfare loss, if the 
installation costs associated with public capital are sufficiently large is evident. With very high 
installation costs, the tied transfer is committing the recipient economy to devote a large portion of 
its resources to the costly task of installation, thereby making it worse off.   
h2
  (ii)    An increase in θ always reduces the welfare gains resulting from a pure transfer.  It 
reduces the gains from a tied transfer as long as a is low and installation costs are not too high.  In all 
other cases, it will raise the welfare gains resulting from a tied transfer. 
 (iii)  Over the range of values included in Table 3, the benefits from pure aid decrease with 
the cost of borrowing.  As s declines the sensitivity to borrowing costs declines, and in fact for 
 (not reported), the benefits from pure aid actually increase with a.  As long as tied aid yields 
positive benefits, these decrease with the cost of borrowing.  In the cases where   are both high, 
so that tied aid leads to welfare losses, these losses decline with the cost of borrowing. 
s= 0.5
s, h2
(iv)  Irrespective of the cost of borrowing, the elasticity of substitution, or the elasticity of 
leisure in utility, the benefits from tied aid decrease, and those from untied aid increase, with 
installation costs. 
(v)  When installation costs are high (h2 = 20), an untied transfer is better than a tied 
transfer even for s = 1 (the Cobb-Douglas case). 
(vi) If  we  consider  s = 1 as a benchmark values, then even small deviations of s from the 
benchmark (in the range 0.8-1.2), lead to moderate variations in welfare changes from untied aid 
programs, irrespective of the cost of installation and finance.  The welfare changes are much more 
dramatic in the case of tied transfers. 
25 5.  Co-financing and Welfare Gains     
  Several aid programs call for co-financing by the domestic government.  In Table 5 we 
compare the welfare effects of the tied and pure aid programs with two alternative forms of co-
financing.  In the first, the government receives a tied aid flow of 2.5% of its income, which it must 
match with an equal increase in its expenditure; in the second it must match an untied aid flow.  In 
all four cases, the economy is experiencing a 5% increase in expenditure. 
  For low or medium elasticity of substitution the tied transfer (TT) is superior to the pure 
transfer (PT), where as for a high s this ordering is reversed, as we have seen.  In all cases the 
matched tied transfer (MTT) is dominated by TT.  This is because the MTT involves making the size 
of the government sector too large.  While the matched pure transfer (MPT) is never dominant, it is 
superior to PT in the case where s  and it is superior to TT for  = 0.8 s=1.2.
19  The rankings are much 
less sensitive to variations in θ, although the tied transfer begins to dominate the pure transfer as θ 
increases from 0.75 to 1, for the Cobb-Douglas production function.  
  We can also show that a tied aid of a given amount, coupled with an equivalent decrease in 
domestic government expenditure, is equivalent to an untied transfer of an equivalent amount.  This 
is important since it implies that by combining the transfer with the appropriate expenditure and tax 
mix, the recipient economy can choose an equilibrium path and associated level of welfare that is 
independent of any constraints imposed by the donor country.   
6. Conclusions 
The receipt of foreign aid inevitably involves some structural adjustment by the recipient 
economy.  In this paper we have investigated this issue in an endogenous growth model of a small 
open economy, where the margins along which the economy may adjust include (i) the intratemporal 
substitution of private capital for public capital, (ii) labor supply, and (iii) the intertemporal margins 
of private and public investment, and foreign borrowing.  Our analysis has shown how the 
introduction of endogenous labor supply introduces a dynamic response to an untied transfer, 
                                                 
19 Chatterjee, Sakoulis, and Turnovsky (2003) address the question of optimal co-financing in the case of the Cobb-
Douglas production.  The analogous exercise can be pursued here. 
26 although virtually opposite in its time profile from the response to a tied transfer. 
We find that the long-run impact of a tied aid program and the direction of transitional 
dynamics it generates depend crucially upon the elasticity of substitution in production and much 
less sensitive to the elasticity of labor supply.  Our numerical simulations suggest that tied aid is 
more effective in economies with a low degree of substitution between factors of production.   
Moreover, the welfare gains from a tied or untied aid shock are sensitive to the substitutability of 
inputs, capital market imperfections, and costs of adjustment.   
  What role does the endogeneity of labor supply play?  One of the striking features of the 
welfare results in Table 1 is that the differences between the intertemporal welfare gains for tied 
versus untied transfers are very small, at least for the benchmark parameters (7.96% vs. 7.71%).  
This contrasts with the substantially larger differences obtained in our earlier work with inelastic 
labor supply (9.83% vs. 8.32%).
20  The reason is that in the present framework any transfer impacts 
welfare in two ways, first through the consumption flows and second through labor supply.  Both 
tied and untied transfers lead to increases in consumption, -- albeit having very different time 
profiles -- leading to improvements in intertemporal welfare.  However, the two types of transfer 
have contrasting effects on leisure.  The untied transfer is leads to an increase in leisure, adding to 
the consumption benefits, while the untied transfer leads to reduced leisure, partially offsetting the 
consumption benefits.  Thus for the benchmark economy the endogeneity of labor supply tends to 
reduce the welfare advantage of a tied transfer. 
  Consider the column   in Table 2.  For low values of  s=1 θ (0.5, 0.75), labor supply is highly 
elastic, so that the response of leisure to either shock is sufficiently large in magnitude for it to 
dominate the welfare derived from consumption, in which case the untied transfer is superior from 
the welfare standpoint.  For high values of θ, the response of leisure is small.  The consumption 
effects dominate so that the tied transfer is clearly superior.  For a low elasticity of substitution the 
leisure effect is positive for both types of transfers and the tied transfer is clearly superior even if θ 
is low and labor is highly elastic.   
Finally, our results carry some important policy advice.  They suggest that when donors 
                                                 
20 See Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2003) 
27 28 
decide on whether a particular aid program should be tied to an investment activity, careful attention 
should be paid to the recipient’s opportunities for substitution in production, its access to world 
capital markets, and the costs of installing the particular type of capital to which the aid will be tied. 
Overall, the effects of a tied transfer are highly sensitive to the specific structural characteristics of 
the recipient economy.  It is perfectly possible for a tied transfer to have a presumably unintended 
adverse effect on the recipient economy, if that economy is structurally different from what the 
donor believed.  On the other hand, the benefits of a comparable untied transfer are remarkably 
robust with respect to the same structural characteristics.  Thus, if the donor economy does not 
possess the detailed information, particularly about the production characteristics of the recipient 
economy, giving untied aid is a less risky strategy. References 
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  The objective of this Appendix is to set out the dynamic macroeconomic equilibrium in terms 
of the four stationary variable,  .  We begin by dividing (3b) by (3a), while noting the 
definition of the real wage, 
,,, znql
(1 ) Y − l ∂∂ , enabling us to write the marginal rate of substitution 
between C and l: 
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Recalling  () () [ ] ,( 1 ) ( 1 zl lz )
ρ
ηη Ω≡ Ω = − − and the definitions of c and y,  we can express the 
output-capital and consumption-capital ratios in the form 
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Then, differentiating the optimality condition, (3a), the marginal rate of substitution condition, (A.1), 
the production function (1), and the definition of k all with respect to time, yields 
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Combining these three equations and recalling (3c’) and (6), we can express the dynamics of labor 
supply by the following differential equation: 
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Using (A.3a) and (A.4) we can express the growth rate of consumption as 
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 (A.5)   
  The equilibrium dynamics can now be represented by the following fourth order system in 
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Steady-state equilibrium is attained when  0 knlq = == =   , so that  
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Using (A.1) and (A.4a)-(A.4e), we can express the steady-state in the following form: 
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(A.6a)-(A.6e) can be solved to yield the equilibrium values of  .  Given these values, we 
can solve for the steady-state output-capital and consumption-capital ratios   
,  ,  ,and  znq l   
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Linearizing (A.5) around the steady state (A.6) the local dynamics are represented by the 
fourth order system 
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A4 Table 1:  Permanent Foreign Aid Shock  
Benchmark Equilibrium: Cobb-Douglas production function (s = 1) 
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b. Short-run Effects 
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 Table  2 
 
A.  Sensitivity of Permanent Responses to the Elasticities of Substitution (s) and Leisure (q) 
 
(i) Tied Aid Shock: f  = 0, q = 0 to 0.05 
 
  s  = 0.8  s = 1  s = 1.2  s = 1.6 
 
l d





















   dy %    l d





















   dy %   l d





















     dy %   l d





















     dy %  
q  = 0.5  0.009  -0.059    0.323    -0.513    1.01   -0.017  -0.042   0.169  -0.396    0.695  -0.04   -0.032   0.088     -0.319      0.499  -0.073  -0.023  0.018     -0.227     0.289 
q  = 0.75  0.009  -0.056    0.373    -0.575   0.997  -0.014  -0.040   0.189  -0.424    0.674  -0.03    -0.031   0.095    -0.325      0.470  -0.054  -0.023   0.019    -0.208     0.252 
q  = 1  0.009  -0.054    0.419    -0.630   0.984  -0.012  -0.039   0.206  -0.446    0.657  -0.026  -0.029   0.101    -0.327      0.446  -0.041  -0.024   0.019    -0.192     0.223 
q  = 2  0.007  -0.046    0.572    -0.814   0.939  -0.007  -0.035   0.254  -0.507    0.608  -0.015  -0.028   0.111    -0.327      0.385  -0.017  -0.025   0.017    -0.147     0.158 
q  = 5  0.005  -0.029    0.912    -1.22     0.840  -0.003  -0.029   0.335  -0.608    0.537  -0.006  -0.026   0.119    -0.315      0.309  -0.005  -0.026   0.013    -0.094     0.094 
 
  
(ii) Untied Aid Shock: f = 0, q  = 0 to 0.05 
 
  s  = 0.8  s = 1  s = 1.2  s = 1.6 
 
l d





















   dy %    l d





















   dy %    l d





















      dy %    l d





















     dy %   
q  = 0.5  0.017   0.052   -0.024    0.036   -0.059  0.019   0.051   -0.014  0.031    -0.047  0.02     0.05     -0.008      0.027     -0.037  0.019   0.049   -0.002     0.020     -0.024 
q  = 0.75  0.015   0.052   -0.031    0.046   -0.066  0.016   0.051   -0.018   0.037   -0.051  0.016   0.05      -0.009     0.030     -0.039  0.013   0.049   -0.002     0.019     -0.022 
q  = 1  0.014   0.052   -0.038   0. 055   -0.069  0.014   0.051   -0.020   0.042   -0.053  0.013   0.05      -0.011     0.032     -0.039  0.010   0.049   -0.002     0.018     -0.020 
q  = 2  0.009   0.052   -0.058    0.080   -0.073  0.008   0.051   -0.028   0.053   -0.055  0.007   0.05      -0.012     0.034     -0.037  0.004   0.050   -0.002     0.014     -0.015 
q  = 5  0.005   0.050   -0.102    0.133   -0.070  0.004   0.051   -0.038   0.067   -0.051  0.003   0.05     -0.014      0.034     -0.031  0.001   0.050   -0.001     0.009     -0.010 
 
 Table 2 
 
B.  Sensitivity of Short-run and Long-run Welfare Responses to the Elasticities of Substitution (s) and Leisure (q) 
 
(i) Tied Aid Shock: f  = 1, q = 0 to 0.05 
 
  s  = 0.8  s = 1  s = 1.2  s = 1.6 
  % 
[ ] (0) W D    ( )  W D  
% 
[ ] (0) W D    ( )  W D  
% 
[ ] (0) W D    ( )  W D  
% 
[ ] (0) W D    ( )  W D  
q  = 0.5      3.64           17.08      -2.30           6.90      -6.95            0.79      -12.78         -5.84 
q  = 0.75      4.47           19.26      -1.86           7.50      -6.80            0.65      -12.64          -6.42 
q  = 1      5.14           21.08      -1.53           7.96      -6.71            0.53      -12.56         -6.82 
q  = 2      7.03           26.46      -0.69           9.15      -6.55            0.16      -12.52          -7.68 
q  = 5      10.34         35.66      0.45          10.79      -6.49             0.43      -12.50          -8.55 
 
  
(ii) Untied Aid Shock: f = 0, q  = 0 to 0.05 
 
  s  = 0.8  s = 1  s = 1.2  s = 1.6 
  % 
[ ] (0) W D    ( )  W D  
% 
[ ] (0) W D    ( )  W D  
% 
[ ] (0) W D    ( )  W D  
% 
[ ] (0) W D    ( )  W D  
q  = 0.5      7.74              7.01  8.43                  7.95      8.94              8.60      9.59            9.40 
q  = 0.75      7.60              6.70  8.37                  7.81      8.94              8.57      9.66            9.47 
q  = 1      7.49              6.47  8.32                  7.71      8.94              8.55      9.70            9.52 
q  = 2      7.22              5.89  8.21                  7.50      8.94              8.54      9.78            9.64 




Welfare Sensitivity to Installation Costs of Public Capital (relative to that of private 
capital), Capital Market Imperfections, and Degree of Substitutability 
(σ = 0 to σ = 0.05) 
(Numbers reported are percentage changes in intertemporal welfare) 
 
A.  Low Installation Costs (h1 = 10, h2 = 1) 
 
 
a = 0.05 
 




φ = 0  φ= 1  φ= 0  φ = 1  φ= 0  φ= 1 
s  =  0.8 6.39 36.38 6.25 28.02  6.24  26.72 
s = 1  9.46  23.06  7.65  15.22  7.15  14.43 
s = 1.2  12.75  15.50  8.66  8.21  7.69  7.53 
 
B.  Medium Installation Costs (h1 = 10, h2 = 10) 
s  =  0.8 6.66 32.28 6.47 23.41  6.45  22.43 
s = 1  10.01  16.65  7.96  9.89  7.40  9.79 
s = 1.2  13.70  6.32  9.03  2.29  7.97  2.61 
 
a = 0.05 
 




φ = 0  φ= 1  φ= 0  φ = 1  φ= 0  φ= 1 
 
C.  High Installation Costs (h1 = 10, h2 = 20) 
 
 
a = 0.05 
 




φ = 0  φ= 1  φ= 0  φ = 1  φ= 0  φ= 1 
s  =  0.8 6.98 27.27 6.74 17.73  6.69  17.24 
s = 1  10.70  8.51  8.33  3.35  7.97  4.22 








Welfare Sensitivity to Installation Costs of Public Capital (relative to that of private 
capital), Capital Market Imperfections, and Sensitivity of Utility to Leisure 
(σ = 0 to σ = 0.05) 
(Numbers reported are percentage changes in intertemporal welfare) 
 
A.  Low Installation Costs (h1 = 10, h2 = 1) 
 
 
a = 0.05 
 




φ = 0  φ= 1  φ= 0  φ = 1  φ= 0  φ= 1 
θ = 0.75  9.98 23.82 7.77 15.08  7.18  14.26 
θ = 1  9.46  23.06  7.65  15.22  7.15  14.43 
θ = 1.25  9.07 22.44 7.57 15.34  7.13  14.57 
 
B.  Medium Installation Costs (h1 = 10, h2 = 10) 
θ = 0.75  10.58 16.82  8.09  9.50  7.43  9.46 
θ = 1  10.01  16.65  7.96  9.89  7.40  9.79 
θ = 1.25  9.57 16.41 7.86 10.21  7.38  10.05 
 
a = 0.05 
 




φ = 0  φ= 1  φ= 0  φ = 1  φ= 0  φ= 1 
 
 
C.  High Installation Costs (h1 = 10, h2 = 20) 
 
θ = 0.75  11.35  7.88 8.47 2.65  7.73  3.71 
θ = 1  10.70  8.51  8.33  3.35  7.70  4.22 
θ = 1.25  10.20  8.80 8.22 3.91  7.67  4.63 
 
a = 0.05 
 








Co-financing Tradeoffs  
(Numbers reported are percentage changes in intertemporal welfare) 
 
  s  = 0.8  s = 1  s = 1.2 
   
 TT       PT     MTT     MPT 
 
 TT     PT      MTT     MPT 
 
 TT      PT     MTT     MPT 
θ  = 0.75  19.26   6.70    14.79      10.69 
TT > MTT> MPT> PT 
7.50    7.81     2.90       4.50 
PT > TT >MPT> MTT 
0.65    8.57    -4.05        0.88 
PT > MPT>TT>MTT 
θ  = 1  21.08   6.47    16.70      11.61 
TT > MTT> MPT> PT 
7.96    7.71     3.40       4.73 
TT > PT >MPT>MTT 
0.53    8.55    -4.15       0.81 
PT > MPT>TT>MTT 
θ  = 1.25  22.66   6.29    18.34      12.40 
TT > MTT> MPT> PT 
8.34    7.64     3.81       4.91 
TT > PT >MPT>MTT 
0.42    8.54    -4.25        0.74    
PT > MPT>TT>MTT 
 
TT : Tied Transfer ( 0.05, 1, 0.05 g σ φ == = ) 
PT : Pure Transfer ( 0.05, 0, 0.05 g σ φ == = ) 
MTT : Matched Tied Transfer ( 0.025, 1, 0.075 g σ φ = == ) 
MPT : Matched Pure Transfer ( 0.025, 0, 0.075 g σ φ = == ) Figure 1. Tied Transfer, s =1 
 
    
 
    
 
 
 Figure 2.  Untied Transfer, s =1 
     
 
       
 
















Fig 3:  Dynamics of Labor-consumption sensitivity to Elasticity of Substitution 
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Fig 4:  Sensitivity of Basic Dynamics to elasticity of Substitution 
 